Skip to content

Defender Daily

Attackers planted KeyDrift malware on Cisco SD-WAN controllers, Talos says

Affected
Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller, Manager and Validator before the first fixed releases, regardless of configuration. All versions and fixes

Cisco Talos said on Oct 28 that a group it tracks as UAT-11473 exploited , an authentication bypass in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN, and installed malware Talos calls KeyDrift. KeyDrift runs inside the controller’s own processes, where it gives the attackers a backdoor and a relay and extracts the keys that protect SD-WAN data-plane traffic. Talos says the targets were in space and satellite services, defense and aerospace, and policy research. Cisco disclosed the flaw on Feb 25, and CISA added it to KEV the same day.

KeyDrift’s main module, PolyFlame, is injected into the controller’s vdaemon processes through modified runit service scripts. It can run commands, read and write files, and relay commands between its command server and other peers. Another module, LittleFilch, hooks SSL_read in vdaemon, pulls key material for chosen edge devices from decrypted control traffic, and stages it in .

Talos assesses with high confidence that UAT-11473’s infrastructure overlaps considerably with Silent Train, which Lumen’s Black Lotus Labs, also on Oct 28, called Volt Typhoon’s covert access network. Lumen says Volt Typhoon was exploiting the same Cisco flaw by late 2025, and kept at it well after Cisco disclosed it.

Cisco updated its advisory on Oct 28 to link the Talos report. Cisco says it’s aware of limited exploitation and lists no workaround. Talos has published Snort rules for the flaw and for KeyDrift’s components.

Vendor
Cisco

What to do

6 steps

Affected and fixed versions

  • Product
    Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN 20.9
    Affected
    Releases before the fixed one
    Fixed
    The fixed 20.9 release in Cisco’s advisory
  • Product
    Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN 20.11
    Affected
    All releases, past end of software maintenance
    Fixed
    The later of the two fixed 20.12 releases in Cisco’s advisory
  • Product
    Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN 20.12
    Affected
    Releases before the fixed ones
    Fixed
    Either fixed 20.12 release in Cisco’s advisory
  • Product
    Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN 20.13 to 20.15
    Affected
    All 20.13 and 20.14 releases, and 20.15 before the fixed one
    Fixed
    The fixed 20.15 release in Cisco’s advisory
  • Product
    Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN 20.16 and 20.18
    Affected
    All 20.16 releases, and 20.18 before the fixed one
    Fixed
    The fixed 20.18 release in Cisco’s advisory
  • Product
    Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN before 20.9
    Affected
    All releases
    Fixed
    Migrate to a fixed release

Indicators

File namePolyFlame module injected into vdaemon
File nameInjector that loads PolyFlame into vdaemon
File nameScript that finds vdaemon processes for injection
File namePacked PolyFlame loader under /etc/sv/aaamgr/
File nameLittleFilch module that hooks SSL_read in vdaemon
File nameLittleFilch’s encrypted staging file
File nameLittleFilch configuration, deleted after it’s read
File nameList of vdaemon process IDs the loader records

Timeline

  1. Feb 25Cisco discloses the flaw, and CISA adds it to KEV.
  2. Oct 28Talos publishes its KeyDrift report, and Cisco links it from its advisory.
  3. Oct 28Lumen publishes its report on Volt Typhoon’s Silent Train network.

Sources

Subscribe

Get the Daily Brief by email

Weekdays at 7am ET.

We’ll email you a link to confirm. Unsubscribe from any email.