Attackers planted KeyDrift malware on Cisco SD-WAN controllers, Talos says
- Affected
- Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller, Manager and Validator before the first fixed releases, regardless of configuration. All versions and fixes
- Vendor
- Cisco
Cisco Talos said on Oct 28 that a group it tracks as UAT-11473 exploited , an authentication bypass in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN, and installed malware Talos calls KeyDrift. KeyDrift runs inside the controller’s own processes, where it gives the attackers a backdoor and a relay and extracts the keys that protect SD-WAN data-plane traffic. Talos says the targets were in space and satellite services, defense and aerospace, and policy research. Cisco disclosed the flaw on Feb 25, and CISA added it to KEV the same day.
KeyDrift’s main module, PolyFlame, is injected into the controller’s vdaemon processes through modified runit service scripts. It can run commands, read and write files, and relay commands between its command server and other peers. Another module, LittleFilch, hooks SSL_read in vdaemon, pulls key material for chosen edge devices from decrypted control traffic, and stages it in .
Talos assesses with high confidence that UAT-11473’s infrastructure overlaps considerably with Silent Train, which Lumen’s Black Lotus Labs, also on Oct 28, called Volt Typhoon’s covert access network. Lumen says Volt Typhoon was exploiting the same Cisco flaw by late 2025, and kept at it well after Cisco disclosed it.
Cisco updated its advisory on Oct 28 to link the Talos report. Cisco says it’s aware of limited exploitation and lists no workaround. Talos has published Snort rules for the flaw and for KeyDrift’s components.
- Vendor
- Cisco
What to do
6 steps
- 3 Look for the KeyDrift files Talos lists, such as /var/tmp/vdaemon.bin and an aaamgrd binary under /etc/sv/aaamgr/, and changed runit scripts for sshd and aaamgr.
Affected and fixed versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
| Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN 20.9 | Releases before the fixed one | The fixed 20.9 release in Cisco’s advisory |
| Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN 20.11 | All releases, past end of software maintenance | The later of the two fixed 20.12 releases in Cisco’s advisory |
| Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN 20.12 | Releases before the fixed ones | Either fixed 20.12 release in Cisco’s advisory |
| Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN 20.13 to 20.15 | All 20.13 and 20.14 releases, and 20.15 before the fixed one | The fixed 20.15 release in Cisco’s advisory |
| Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN 20.16 and 20.18 | All 20.16 releases, and 20.18 before the fixed one | The fixed 20.18 release in Cisco’s advisory |
| Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN before 20.9 | All releases | Migrate to a fixed release |
- Product
- Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN 20.9
- Affected
- Releases before the fixed one
- Fixed
- The fixed
20.9release in Cisco’s advisory
- Product
- Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN 20.11
- Affected
- All releases, past end of software maintenance
- Fixed
- The later of the two fixed
20.12releases in Cisco’s advisory
- Product
- Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN 20.12
- Affected
- Releases before the fixed ones
- Fixed
- Either fixed
20.12release in Cisco’s advisory
- Product
- Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN 20.13 to 20.15
- Affected
- All
20.13and20.14releases, and20.15before the fixed one - Fixed
- The fixed
20.15release in Cisco’s advisory
- Product
- Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN 20.16 and 20.18
- Affected
- All
20.16releases, and20.18before the fixed one - Fixed
- The fixed
20.18release in Cisco’s advisory
- Product
- Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN before 20.9
- Affected
- All releases
- Fixed
- Migrate to a fixed release
Indicators
| Type | Value | Note |
|---|---|---|
| File name | PolyFlame module injected into vdaemon | |
| File name | Injector that loads PolyFlame into vdaemon | |
| File name | Script that finds vdaemon processes for injection | |
| File name | Packed PolyFlame loader under /etc/sv/aaamgr/ | |
| File name | LittleFilch module that hooks SSL_read in vdaemon | |
| File name | LittleFilch’s encrypted staging file | |
| File name | LittleFilch configuration, deleted after it’s read | |
| File name | List of vdaemon process IDs the loader records |
- File namePolyFlame module injected into vdaemon
- File nameInjector that loads PolyFlame into vdaemon
- File nameScript that finds vdaemon processes for injection
- File namePacked PolyFlame loader under /etc/sv/aaamgr/
- File nameLittleFilch module that hooks SSL_read in vdaemon
- File nameLittleFilch’s encrypted staging file
- File nameLittleFilch configuration, deleted after it’s read
- File nameList of vdaemon process IDs the loader records
Timeline
- Feb 25Cisco discloses the flaw, and CISA adds it to KEV.
- Oct 28Talos publishes its KeyDrift report, and Cisco links it from its advisory.
- Oct 28Lumen publishes its report on Volt Typhoon’s Silent Train network.
Sources
- Cisco Talos researchPrimary source blog.talosintelligence.com
- Cisco advisoryPrimary source sec.cloudapps.cisco.com
- Lumen researchPrimary source lumen.com