Phishing lures enroll PCs in attackers’ MDM tenants, Huntress says
Huntress said on Oct 28 that phishing emails got victims’ computers enrolled in mobile device management tenants that attackers control, and the attackers used them to install ScreenConnect. In one case a fake DocuSign installer carried a Hexnode MDM package, and in another a fake Teams invite enrolled a receptionist’s computer in an attacker’s Rippling tenant. Huntress says neither Hexnode nor Rippling is at fault.
In the Hexnode case, emails with subjects like “ATTN: Official Invitation to Submit Proposal” linked to a download saved as , which installed Hexnode’s gateway and agent. The attacker then installed ScreenConnect, which connected to the attacker’s relay. The MSP removed it, but another copy was installed and reconnected to the same relay hours later, and Huntress isolated the computer.
In the Rippling case, an email titled “Re: Tax Planning and Preparation Inquiry” led to a page titled “Calendar” on a lookalike Teams domain. That page redirected to another that helped enroll the computer. About a minute later the computer was registered in Rippling, and its agent was installed with SYSTEM permissions. About 35 minutes after that, the attackers used the MDM to run a ScreenConnect installer.
Huntress says removing the remote access tool doesn’t remove the management path that delivered it, so MDM enrollment should be treated as security-sensitive. The sequence it says to watch for is a lure, then a new MDM enrollment, then a remote access tool install, then traffic to an unfamiliar relay.
What to do
5 steps
Indicators
URLs and domains copy defanged. Use Copy raw for queries.
| Type | Value | Note |
|---|---|---|
| URL | Delivered the fake DocuSign installer in the Hexnode case | |
| File name | Fake DocuSign installer that installed Hexnode’s MDM components | |
| Domain | ScreenConnect relay on port 8041 in the Hexnode case | |
| URL | Lookalike Teams “Calendar” page in the Rippling case | |
| URL | Lookalike Teams page used to enroll computers in Rippling | |
| Domain | ScreenConnect relay on port 8041 in the Rippling case |
- URLDelivered the fake DocuSign installer in the Hexnode case
- File nameFake DocuSign installer that installed Hexnode’s MDM components
- DomainScreenConnect relay on port 8041 in the Hexnode case
- URLLookalike Teams “Calendar” page in the Rippling case
- URLLookalike Teams page used to enroll computers in Rippling
- DomainScreenConnect relay on port 8041 in the Rippling case
Timeline
- Oct 28Huntress publishes its report on the attacks.
Sources
- Huntress researchPrimary source huntress.com