Turla hides Cereal espionage tools inside government Exchange servers, ESET says
ESET says Turla, an espionage group widely assessed to be part of Russia’s FSB, used a new toolset it calls Cereal. It ran on Exchange servers at two government organizations, in Kazakhstan and Romania. Its backdoor waits for commands sent to paths that look like ordinary Exchange traffic, and another component collects mail from inside Exchange’s transport service. ESET attributes the toolset to Turla with high confidence.
ESET found the toolset on Nov 28, 2025, at a government organization in Kazakhstan, and a month later at one in Romania. There, a component called CerealBox was set to collect messages involving NATO and EU addresses. ESET’s post doesn’t say how the attackers first got into either network.
The backdoor, CerealNeuron, makes no outbound connections. It listens on the compromised Exchange server for encrypted requests to paths such as /owa/sdds/, /AUTODISCOVER/PROXYSERVICE/ and /MICROSOFT-SERVER-ACTIVESYNC/INTEGRATED/API/. Requests that fail its checks are redirected to a normal-looking Exchange error page. ESET couldn’t identify the operators’ IP addresses.
Each command arrives as its own small .NET program. The commands ESET saw pull mailboxes through Exchange Web Services, query Active Directory, run WMI queries, extract LSA secrets and read or delete files. A variant, CerealHermit, reads commands from encrypted files on disk instead.
CerealBox is injected into EdgeTransport.exe and wraps the handlers of existing transport agents, so no new agent appears in Exchange’s configuration. It stages messages with .doc, .docx or .pdf attachments that match its lists of senders, recipients, subjects or file names. ESET calls injecting into the transport service a technique not documented before.
The loader hid as ncobjapi.dll and wbemcomn.dll in C:\Windows\System32\wbem\, where the WMI service loads it. It was also planted in the .NET native image cache under names such as Microsoft.Exchange.Search.Mdb.ni.dll, so Exchange loads it in place of the real library.
What to do
4 steps
Indicators
| Type | Value | Note |
|---|---|---|
| SHA-1 | CerealLoader as ncobjapi.dll | |
| SHA-1 | CerealLoader as wbemcomn.dll | |
| SHA-1 | CerealLoader as Microsoft.Exchange.Search.Mdb.ni.dll | |
| SHA-1 | CerealLoader as Microsoft.Exchange.Data.Transport.ni.dll | |
| SHA-1 | CerealLoader as EdgeTransport.ni.exe | |
| SHA-1 | CerealLoader as Microsoft.Exchange.EdgeSyncSvc.ni.exe | |
| SHA-1 | CerealLoader as version.dll | |
| SHA-1 | CerealLoader as version.dll | |
| SHA-1 | CerealLoader as Microsoft.Search.Platform.dll | |
| SHA-1 | CerealLoader as Microsoft.Ceres.dll | |
| SHA-1 | CerealLoader as iph.dat | |
| SHA-1 | CerealRunner | |
| SHA-1 | CerealSprinter | |
| SHA-1 | CerealHermit | |
| SHA-1 | CerealIron | |
| SHA-1 | CerealMoth | |
| SHA-1 | Bootstrapper DLL, 32-bit | |
| SHA-1 | Bootstrapper DLL, 64-bit |
- SHA-1CerealLoader as ncobjapi.dll
- SHA-1CerealLoader as wbemcomn.dll
- SHA-1CerealLoader as Microsoft.Exchange.Search.Mdb.ni.dll
- SHA-1CerealLoader as Microsoft.Exchange.Data.Transport.ni.dll
- SHA-1CerealLoader as EdgeTransport.ni.exe
- SHA-1CerealLoader as Microsoft.Exchange.EdgeSyncSvc.ni.exe
- SHA-1CerealLoader as version.dll
- SHA-1CerealLoader as version.dll
- SHA-1CerealLoader as Microsoft.Search.Platform.dll
- SHA-1CerealLoader as Microsoft.Ceres.dll
- SHA-1CerealLoader as iph.dat
- SHA-1CerealRunner
- SHA-1CerealSprinter
- SHA-1CerealHermit
- SHA-1CerealIron
- SHA-1CerealMoth
- SHA-1Bootstrapper DLL, 32-bit
- SHA-1Bootstrapper DLL, 64-bit
Sources
- ESET researchPrimary source welivesecurity.com
- ESET Turla indicators on GitHubPrimary source github.com