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Attackers used ScreenConnect panels to install rogue clients, Huntress says

· Updated

Update, : Huntress says a second wave on Nov 13 put rogue ScreenConnect clients on 205 hosts at 41 organizations, served from 185.241.211[.]197 at a bulletproof hosting provider. In one case the client ran as a service named “Windows Update Agent”. ConnectWise again urged partners to keep the extensions disabled and run technician clients at 26.6.5 or later, Huntress says.

Update, : Microsoft published its analysis of SCKit on Nov 13, with Defender detections, hunting queries and more file hashes. Citing ConnectWise, it says ScreenConnect client 26.6.5 and later block the kit’s attempt to spread from an infected endpoint to a connecting technician. Updating a cloud console doesn’t update those clients, Microsoft says.

Update, : ConnectWise published for RMM+ on Nov 12 and scores it 9.3, saying the extension’s default static API secret can let attackers send commands to managed agents. ConnectWise removed RMM+ from hosted servers and tells on-premises partners to keep it disabled. No fixed version has been announced.

On Nov 11, an attacker used access to several cloud-hosted ConnectWise ScreenConnect panels to install attacker-controlled ScreenConnect clients and a toolkit Huntress calls SCKit on endpoints the panels manage. Huntress saw them on at least 288 hosts at 48 of the organizations it protects, all within 90 minutes. Huntress says the activity seems related to RMM+, a third-party extension whose versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepted a blank access key. ConnectWise disabled RMM+ and four other extensions on its hosted servers as a precaution.

The operator used the panels’ Run Command feature to send commands to many endpoints at once, running as SYSTEM. Each command checked for an existing ScreenConnect client, silently installed one from the attacker’s server and fetched SCKit, a package of 16 scripts and configuration files. The kit stops the legitimate ScreenConnect client and puts the attacker’s copy in its place, adds Defender exclusions and creates a scheduled task named TrapWatch.

SCKit is also built to spread. When a technician connects to an infected endpoint, it tries to copy a dropper to the technician’s workstation and steal the panel’s session cookie. With that cookie, it would push the kit to every endpoint the technician can reach. Huntress says this takeover attempt failed in every recovered host log it has checked so far.

RMM+ lets another tool drive ScreenConnect sessions without a technician in the console. It skips ScreenConnect’s user accounts, roles and MFA and checks a shared access key instead. In those two versions the key defaulted to blank, and the check accepted an empty one. Huntress’s analysis suggests most RMM+ installations it found were legitimate, often added for a project and left in place. Huntress says the newest ScreenConnect releases are affected.

ConnectWise’s advisory, posted at 5:45 p.m. ET on Nov 11, said it hadn’t yet identified the initial access vector or the full scope, according to Huntress. ConnectWise disabled five extensions across more than 400 partner environments and urged on-premises partners to do the same. Huntress says it saw similar worm-like activity with rogue ScreenConnect clients in September, but it doesn’t say the two are connected.

CVE
Vendor
ConnectWise

What to do

8 steps

Indicators

IPs and domains copy defanged. Use Copy raw for queries.

IP addressAttacker ScreenConnect server that serves the client installer
DomainAttacker relay that resolves to the same server
DomainAttacker relay on port 81, also on the same server
DomainAttacker-controlled ScreenConnect panel
IP addressAddress of the attacker-controlled panel
DomainCommand-and-control domain
DomainHost that serves the stager, the loader and a SQLite tool
IP addressServer that hosted the rogue client in the Nov 13 wave
DomainAttacker relay on port 88 in the Nov 13 wave
SHA-256Panel-Lateral.ps1, weak on its own since scripts are rebuilt
SHA-256TrapWatch.ps1, weak on its own since scripts are rebuilt
SHA-256ToolboxRelayUploader.exe, which uploads the payload to the Shared Toolbox
SHA-256The sc.msi installer for the rogue client, per Microsoft
SHA-256The staged SCKit ZIP archive, per Microsoft

Timeline

  1. Nov 11Commands sent through ScreenConnect panels from about 12:47 p.m. ET reach 288 hosts within 90 minutes, Huntress says.
  2. Nov 11ConnectWise posts an advisory at 5:45 p.m. ET and disables five third-party extensions as a precaution.
  3. Nov 11Huntress says at 11:34 p.m. ET that the activity seems related to the RMM+ extension.
  4. Nov 13A second wave from about 11:12 a.m. ET reaches 205 hosts at 41 organizations, Huntress says.

Sources

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