Fake crypto-named sessions planted on 118 ScreenConnect servers, Huntress says
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- ConnectWise
Since Nov 3, someone has enrolled more than 2,000 unauthorized guest sessions with crypto exchange names, like KUCOIN-SRV, on 118 self-hosted ScreenConnect servers at 109 organizations, Huntress says. The sessions haven’t pushed files or run commands, and joining them has triggered nothing so far. Huntress’s leading hypothesis is that they’re bait for technicians whose clients are still open to . Attackers are exploiting that flaw, which lets a guest make a technician’s client run a file.
The sessions come from a scripted emulator that impersonates a Windows ScreenConnect client, and 97.8% of their connections came from one IONOS-hosted address, Huntress says. A guest needs only a server’s relay address to register, and that address is in the server’s guest installer, which ScreenConnect serves without sign-in by design. On the first server Huntress examined, the MSP’s Access installer was publicly downloadable, and an online file-scanning service had fetched it in mid-October.
In the console each fake looks like an always-online computer with an empty company field and a thumbnail of what looks like a trading desktop. Its name pairs an exchange with a role, like SRV-BINANCE or BACKUP-PROBIT. Every one claims guest client version 25.3.4.9288. Across 29 servers with full connection histories, the operator came back every 151 seconds to create or reconnect sessions.
In a handful of cases a technician opened a fake session, mostly for under 30 seconds. One technician typed into a session twice with ScreenConnect’s send text feature, which Huntress treated as a possible credential exposure, since ScreenConnect doesn’t keep what was sent. Huntress can’t rule out other goals, such as capturing what technicians type, and found no overlap with the indicators published for the SCKit worm on Nov 11.
Huntress doesn’t think the sessions come from the Joe Sandbox analysis service running ScreenConnect installers, as some public discussion suggested. The guests send no key, reuse seven screenshot families and randomize hardware details, and they revisited more than 100 servers in the same order daily for 10 days.
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- ConnectWise
What to do
8 steps
Indicators
IPs copy defanged. Use Copy raw for queries.
| Type | Value | Note |
|---|---|---|
| IP address | IONOS server behind 97.8% of the fake guest connections, Nov 3 to 13 | |
| IP address | Created the first three fake sessions on Nov 3 | |
| IP address | Related IONOS host with the same TLS certificates, no sessions seen from it |
- IP addressIONOS server behind 97.8% of the fake guest connections, Nov 3 to 13
- IP addressCreated the first three fake sessions on Nov 3
- IP addressRelated IONOS host with the same TLS certificates, no sessions seen from it
Timeline
- Nov 3The first three fake sessions are enrolled from an Egyptian residential address, Huntress says.
- Nov 12An MSP asks Huntress about unfamiliar crypto-named machines in its ScreenConnect console.
- Nov 13Huntress publishes its findings, with fake sessions on 118 servers.
Sources
- Huntress researchPrimary source huntress.com