ScreenConnect client flaw used to hijack MSP technicians’ PCs, Huntress says
- Affected
- ScreenConnect host clients and Access agents before
26.6.5, not ScreenConnect servers. All versions and fixes
- Vendor
- ConnectWise
Attackers are exploiting , a ConnectWise ScreenConnect client flaw, against managed service providers, Huntress says. A guest in a remote session can push a file to the technician’s host client and get it to run, with no prompt. On Nov 12, a batch file pushed that way installed a rebranded ScreenConnect client on an MSP technician’s workstation in about 9 seconds. ConnectWise fixed the flaw in client 26.6.5 on Sep 8, and CISA added it to KEV on Sep 11.
The flaw is in the technician’s client, not the server. ConnectWise’s advisory, as Huntress summarizes it, says a guest in a Support or Access session could trigger file transfers that the host client processed without authorization or confirmation. That included running the file with elevated rights. A technician only has to join the session, whether it comes from an attacker’s machine or is a real customer session the attacker has joined as an extra guest. Updating the server doesn’t fix it, Huntress notes, because the vulnerable code runs on the technician’s machine.
In the Nov 12 compromise, the batch file reported the new victim to a Telegram bot and downloaded an installer from . It then started a client named after Windows Update that connects to the attacker’s relay. The same file had been sprayed at five MSP servers 43 minutes earlier, and Huntress assesses with high confidence that one operator runs both the spray and the domain. Hours later, a guest pushed a harmless text file to a technician at another MSP, and that technician’s client opened it, which Huntress reads as a test run.
The spray is broad. Guests on 42 MSP servers made the 688,000 requests from 29 IP addresses, waiting for any technician to join. Huntress also found at least four more technicians exposed to guest-pushed files in October, including attempts to drop Sync.bat into a technician’s Startup folder through path traversal. In these cases, many technicians were still running 22.x, 24.2 and 25.8 clients weeks after the fix shipped.
Huntress says this activity is separate from SCKit, the worm that spread through ScreenConnect panels from Nov 11, and from the fake crypto-named guest sessions it reported on Nov 13. It hasn’t seen those sessions used to exploit the flaw. Huntress hasn’t linked the spray to a named group.
- Vendor
- ConnectWise
What to do
8 steps
Affected and fixed versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
| ScreenConnect host client and Access agent | Every version before 26.6.5 | 26.6.5 or later |
- Product
- ScreenConnect host client and Access agent
- Affected
- Every version before
26.6.5 - Fixed
26.6.5or later
Indicators
Domains, URLs and IPs copy defanged. Use Copy raw for queries.
| Type | Value | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Domain | Attacker ScreenConnect relay on port 8041 and payload host | |
| URL | Second-stage installer holding the rebranded ScreenConnect client | |
| SHA-256 | WindowsUpdate.WindowsClient.exe, the rogue ScreenConnect client | |
| IP address | Address that masterdarky[.]com resolves to | |
| IP address | Sprayer IP | |
| IP address | Guest that pushed the test file to a technician | |
| IP address | Guest that pushed the Startup folder path traversal file | |
| IP address | Guest that pushed the Startup folder path traversal file | |
| File name | Guest-pushed first stage in the Nov 12 compromise |
- DomainAttacker ScreenConnect relay on port 8041 and payload host
- URLSecond-stage installer holding the rebranded ScreenConnect client
- SHA-256WindowsUpdate.WindowsClient.exe, the rogue ScreenConnect client
- IP addressAddress that masterdarky[.]com resolves to
- IP addressSprayer IP
- IP addressGuest that pushed the test file to a technician
- IP addressGuest that pushed the Startup folder path traversal file
- IP addressGuest that pushed the Startup folder path traversal file
- File nameGuest-pushed first stage in the Nov 12 compromise
Timeline
- Sep 8ConnectWise discloses the flaw and fixes it in ScreenConnect client
26.6.5. - Sep 11CISA adds the flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
- Oct 20Huntress begins seeing guest run-file requests sprayed at MSP ScreenConnect servers.
- Oct 23–27An attacker in real support sessions tries to drop
Sync.batinto three technicians’ Startup folders. - Nov 12A guest-pushed batch file takes over an MSP technician’s workstation at about 11:46 a.m. ET.
- Nov 12A technician at another MSP opens a test file a guest pushed, at about 8:49 p.m. ET.
- Nov 16Huntress publishes its findings.
Sources
- Huntress researchPrimary source huntress.com
- CVE recordPrimary source cve.org