Falcon framework stole government logins from inside browsers, Unit 42 says
Unit 42 says an operator used Falcon, a command-and-control framework that runs as JavaScript inside a victim’s browser, against government agencies between March and May. The victims were in one Middle Eastern and four Southeast Asian countries, including foreign, defense and interior ministries and law enforcement. The operator placed Falcon’s script on webmail portals and government web applications to steal passwords, email, session cookies and communications. Falcon also delivered Antino, an implant that uses Microsoft OneDrive for command and control.
Falcon builds a uniquely obfuscated script for each browser session that loads a compromised page. The script keeps an encrypted WebSocket connection open while the tab is open and lets the operator run any JavaScript in the page. Two browser extensions, one posing as a PDF reader, give the operator wider control: reading credentials and cookies, swapping file downloads for the operator’s own and watching the clipboard. Unit 42 says it doesn’t know how the operator installs the extensions.
At a Middle Eastern foreign ministry, the operator added a script tag to the header of its Roundcube webmail, and Unit 42 counted 39 affected Roundcube instances in that country. At a Southeast Asian police agency, a custom module collected usernames, then showed chosen users a fake Adobe Flash Player update that delivered Antino. At a justice agency, a sideloaded Chrome extension checked in every few minutes for more than three weeks.
Antino is written in Rust and dates to at least Oct 6, 2025, by its earliest compilation time. It stores its OneDrive credentials in its configuration, beacons by writing heartbeat files to a OneDrive folder and persists through a Windows Registry Run key.
Unit 42 assesses with high confidence that Falcon and PeckBirdy, a framework Trend Micro reported in January, are variants of the same framework. The report doesn’t name a group, and it doesn’t say how the operator gained the access it needed to change the agencies’ portals.
What to do
5 steps
Indicators
Domains copy defanged. Use Copy raw for queries.
| Type | Value | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Domain | Falcon command-and-control domain | |
| Domain | Falcon command-and-control domain | |
| Domain | Falcon command-and-control domain | |
| Domain | Payload delivery domain that served the fake Flash installer | |
| Domain | Payload delivery domain | |
| SHA-256 | Antino sample named as a Flash Player installer | |
| SHA-256 | background.js from the Chrome extension | |
| SHA-256 | manifest.json from the Chrome extension |
- DomainFalcon command-and-control domain
- DomainFalcon command-and-control domain
- DomainFalcon command-and-control domain
- DomainPayload delivery domain that served the fake Flash installer
- DomainPayload delivery domain
- SHA-256Antino sample named as a Flash Player installer
- SHA-256background.js from the Chrome extension
- SHA-256manifest.json from the Chrome extension
Sources
- Unit 42 researchPrimary source unit42.paloaltonetworks.com